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RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES-JURISDICTION OF THE TAX CoURT--Plaintiff sought to en join
the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission from enforcing the
War- Contracts Renegotiation Act against its contracts with the British Ministry of War on the ground that they were outside the scope of the act,· and
attempted to obtain a declaratory judgment to this effect. Prior to this proceeding the plaintiff had been given notice and had been requested_ to attend
a confe~ence. He :filed an objection to the authority of the Maritime Commission which, in turn, contended that the United States was responsible for ·payment under th.e contract and that the administrative remedies had not been
exhausted. On these grounds the district court dismissed the complaint. T.he
circuit court of appeals reversed the lower court.1 Held, reversed. The federal
court was witl)out jurisdiction to enjoin and determine the rights of the parties
since the statutory r.emedy had not been exhausted. Macauley v. Waterman
Steamship Co., (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 712. ·
In this situation two doctrines compete with each ·other for supremacy. On
one hand, the Renegotiation Act 2 and its amendments 3 prescrib.e detailed steps
before administrative agencies 4 and the·Tax Court 5 to contest rights to profits

(App. D.C. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 292.
.
56 Stat. L. 245, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1.946) Appx. §u91.
.
3 57 Stat. L. 347, 564, 58 Stat. L. 21, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) Appx. §u91.
4 First, a-conference is called after notice has been given to the contractor. An
agreement is sought at this conference as to the amount of profits due the contractor.
The agreement is binding if reached. If no agreement is reached the bo~rd makes an
ex parte determination and mails the statement to the contractor. It may then collect
the amount of the excess profits due by reducing accounts payable to the contractor,
directing other contractors to withhold payments, or by recovering the amount by suit.
5 The contractor may appeal to the Tax Court for a trial ninety days after the
order for redetermination has been issued. There is no direct review -of the determina1
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arising from contracts subject to its provisions. On the other hand, there is the
fundamental rule that an administrative agency cannot make a conclusive determination of its own power wh.en it is charged that the agency is acting beyond
the power so delegated to it. The former principle prevails in the instant case .
. Several reasons may be advanced to suppoi:_t this position. First, the Renegotiation Act stipulates that a contractor must attend a conference where the basis
of profits under his wartime contract will b.e settled. He is then entitled to a
trial de novo before the Tax Court on all the issues including the facts which
led to the finding by the administrative agency ·or officer representing the government under the contract. By statute the Tax Court 1s given exclusiye jurisdiction of such war contracts, no doubt becaus.e of its technical competency in
matters of profit accounting and its specialized background and experience. The
contractor up to this point is confronted with ·a strong statutory policy. In the
i?stant case he was at a special disadvantage because he could show no compliance with this policy inasmuch as he had refused to follow the statutory procedure in 'view of his contention that there was no po;wer to enforce compliance
to an inapplicable statute. His position was a strong one if needless action were
to be avoided. However, precedents in other areas of administrative law require
compliance though it may be found later that the statute was not applicable. 6
This view is sustained on the ground that the petitioner may obtain the relief
he desires from the administrative agent or agency and that, in case he does not,
a clear record will be presented to the reviewing court. The Court in the principal case justified the rejection of the second principle which would allow injunctive and/or declaratory judgment relief by pointing to Myers v. Bethlehem Ship
Building Corp. 1 There, too, in the absence of express statutory treatment of the
jurisdictional fact issue, the administrative. body was allowed to determine the
scope of the statue under which it functioned. In reality, this issue bears a closer
analogy to a contest of the constitutional power of the administrative agency
because without the requisite jurisdictional or constitutional authority the proceedings are void. It is of interest to note that when constitutionality is assailed
under the Renegotiation Act this attack is treated in much the same fashion
as the contest here. No relief is given in either case where the administrative
process has not reached its final stage or where there is only threatened injury.9
In the principal case the Court refused to consider as a basis for injunctive relief
that the petitioner would be subjected (a) to penalties unless he submitted
tion of the Tax Court. lt has been suggested that he may also bring suit in the
Court of Claims. See Steadman, "Renegotiation of War Contracts: II," 43 M1cH. L.
REV. 235 at 259-274 (1944).
6
Prentice v. Atlantic Coastline Co., 2II U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908); P. F.
Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 54 S.Ct. 277 (1934).
7
303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1938).
8
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943), rehearing de•nied, 321 U.S. 231, 64 S.Ct. 495 (1944). Trust under Will of. Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
·
9
Rolls-Royce, Inc. v. Stimson, (D.C. D.C. 1944) 56 F'. Supp. 22; 153 A.L.R.
1455 (1944); Lincoln Electric Co. v. Knox, (D.C. D.C. 1945) 56 F. Supp. 308;
Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 66 S.Ct. 219 (1945); 44
MICH. L. REV. 861 (1946).
C
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information and (b) to the task of collecting funds by multifarious suits in case
he was overruled by the Maritime Commission. There is this difference, however. Here the contractor in denying the liability of the United States to pay,
rather than trying to assert it, was not in the same position as a contractor bringing a suit against the United States to test the constitutionality of the statute.
This case indicates that the court will carry the idea of exhaustion of administrative remedies to its logical extreme in denying judicial relief to a party asserting a jurisdictional immunity to administrative authority. Presumably, a suit
for injunctive or declaratory judgment relief is proper procedure once the administrative agency and the Tax Court have completed their functions.
Rosemary Sco-tt, S.Ed.

